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Sour Grapes: Unrestrained Bid
Protest Litigation in Rhode Island -
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode
Island v. Najarian
Brian P. Stern* & Daniel W. Majcher**
The Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (APA) does
not apply to government procurement bid protest controversies.
Judicial review under the APA encompasses matters involving a
"contested case," and provides that "review shall be conducted by
the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record."
1 Ad-
ditionally, the APA gives the Rhode Island Supreme Court discre-
tion to hear a final administrative appeal through the issuance of
a writ of certiorari. 2 The Rhode Island Purchasing Act (Purchasing
Act) is silent on whether an aggrieved party, usually a losing bid-
der, may be heard in the form of an administrative hearing.
3 A
* Brian P. Stern, Esq., is the Executive Director of the Rhode Island
Department of Administration and was the Chief Legal Officer for the Execu-
tive Branch during the Blue Cross litigation. Mr. Stern was subsequently
designated as the State Purchasing Agent by Governor Carcieri in January
2005. Mr. Stern is also an adjunct Professor at the Roger Williams University
School of Law.
** Daniel W. Majcher was a Legal Intern for the Rhode Island Depart-
ment of Administration during the Blue Cross litigation. Mr. Majcher is a
graduate of the Roger Williams University School of Law, and served as an
Editor on the Law Review. Prior to law school, he worked for nearly seven
years at Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and Fidelity Investments. In 1996, he
graduated from Brown University with a Bachelor of Arts in American His-
tory.
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(f) (Supp. 2004).
2. Id. § 42-35-16.
3. The Purchasing Act only provides a losing bidder the opportunity to
present a challenge through a bid protest letter, not a hearing. Id. § 37-2-
52(b). The ABA Model Procurement Code provides an optional hearing review
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hearing is necessary for a "contested case" to arise, and, therefore,
the APA is rendered inapplicable in the absence of a hearing.4
Thus, a lawsuit challenging a government procurement award
may be brought without the limitations imposed by the APA. As a
result, government resources are wasted, taxpayer dollars are
consumed and government officials are placed in a "legalistic
straightjacket."5
The ability to bring a lawsuit under the Purchasing Act with-
out the procedural limits imposed by the APA creates an interest-ing paradox. State officials are entitled to a "presumption of
correctness" in making procurement decisions.6 This presumption
means that a decision to award a state contract may not be over-
turned unless a challenger (usually a losing bidder) has shown
that the State official or officials "acted so corruptly or in badfaith, or so unreasonably or so arbitrarily as to be guilty of a pal-
pable abuse of discretion."7 In other words, a party attempting to
overturn a government procurement decision faces an extremelydifficult burden, more so than the burden faced to overturn a deci-
sion made by a government agency under the APA. Despite having
a more onerous burden, bid protest litigation lacks any of the pro-
cedural constraints imposed by the APA.8 Losing bidders may pro-
by a Procurement Review Panel. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-4410(6)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004). Rhode Island adopted the Model Code, but did notinclude the option for a hearing. See Bradford Assocs. v. R.I. Div. of Pur-
chases, 772 A.2d 485, 491 (R.I. 2001).4. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has decided that a hearing is nec-essary to create a "contested case," and, therefore, the absence of a hearing
makes the APA inapplicable. See Bradford Assocs., 772 A.2d at 491; Prop.Advisory Group, Inc. v. Rylant, 636 A.2d 317, 318 (R.I. 1994).5. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 400 (R.I.
1970).
6. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-51 (1997).
7. Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399.8. Some states have adopted by statute a hearing procedure for bid pro-tests and judicial review may, therefore, fall under the respective state Ad-ministrative Procedure Act (APA). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-4410 (5) (Law.Co-op. Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(3) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODEANN. § 63-56-57 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4360 (A) (Michie 2001). Otherstates, such as Pennsylvania, may provide only the option for a hearing, but
regardless place limits on the scope of bid protest litigation. 62 PA. CONS.STAT. ANN. § 1711.1. (West 2004). Other state legislatures have left the deci-sion regarding a hearing and other processes to the state agency. See LA. REV.STAT. ANN §§ 39:1671(B), 39:1490 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-13-1-18(West 2004); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 41-2614 (2004). In these states, it appears
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ceed with an unbridled lawsuit and expensive, time-consuming
discovery with a very limited chance of success.9 The Purchasing
Act should therefore be amended, consistent with the APA, to re-
solve the disparity between the standard of review and the scope
of the lawsuit.10
The State procurement process, which is largely mandated by
the legislature in the Procurement Act, is comprehensive and in-
cludes several safeguards. However, on several occasions the su-
perior court has overturned the government's procurement
decisions.1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, applying Rhode Is-
land General Law section 37-2-51, has then overturned the supe-
rior court. 12 The recent procurement of the State health care
contract and the ensuing litigation between the State and Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island (Blue Cross) epitomizes
this problematic occurrence. In November 2004, the State
awarded the employee health care contract to United Healthcare
(United). Blue Cross lost the bid. Blue Cross, with a vast amount
of resources 13 and in an apparent effort to undermine a high pro-
that bid protest litigation would fall under the state APA. At least one state
expressly excludes judicial review under the state APA. COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-109-107 (2004). Oregon's statute allows judicial review "only if the suit or
writ of review is filed before the opening of bids, proposals or offers." OR. REV.
STAT. § 279B.405(7) (2004). However, if a suit in Oregon is filed prior to the
opening of bids, the review is conducted de novo. Id. § 279B.405(10). One
thing is clear, however: every state varies slightly in their law, regulation,
process and standard of review in regards to bid protest lawsuits.
9. In the recent litigation between Rhode Island and Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Rhode Island (Blue Cross), Blue Cross was allowed to depose
seven state officials, including the Director of Administration, Beverly E. Na-
jarian. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1077
n.1 (R.I. 2005).
10. These "procedural judicial review provisions" should include the abil-
ity of a superior court judge to hear extrinsic evidence in cases that involve
irregularities in procedure. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(f) (1997). Addition-
ally, the supreme court should have the discretion to grant a writ of certiorari
to review a superior court decision when the court deems it appropriate. See
Id. § 42-35-16.
11. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1091
(R.I. 2005); H.V. Collins Co. V. Tarro, 696 A.2d 298, 304-05 (R.I. 1997); Truk
Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc., 643 A.2d 811, 817 (R.I.
1994).
12. Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1091; Collins, 696 A.2d at 305-06; Truk Away,
643 A.2d at 816.
13. Blue Cross is a not-for-profit corporation and is permitted under law
to distribute administrative fees, including legal fees, to its policyholders in
2005]
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file award to a competitor, brought a lawsuit against the State.14
Blue Cross embarked on a "fishing expedition"15 and deposed nu-
merous State officials, including a member of the Governor's cabi-
net, the Rhode Island Director of Administration.16 The superior
court judge, based on depositions taken by Blue Cross attorneys,
granted a preliminary injunction and overturned the decision of
State's Chief Purchasing Officer,7 contrary to thirty-five years of
court precedent.' 8
In addition to the burden and expense of defending itself, the
State was forced to delay the implementation of its new health
care contract.' 9 The supreme court ultimately reversed the deci-
sion, as it had done on other occasions when a superior court judge
improperly interfered with the purchasing process. 20 The Chief
Purchasing Officer's initial decision to award the contract to
United was upheld. 21 However, State officials were "shackled" as
result of the lawsuit 22 and access to health care services for 52,000
the form of a rate increase. See In re Calderone, 520 A.2d 696 (R.I. 1987); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-62-13 (Supp. 2004).
14. Approximately four years earlier, the shoe was on the other foot when
Blue Cross was awarded the health care contract. At that time, United-
Healthcare (United) brought a lawsuit against the State. However, after thefirst stage where United lost in its quest for injunctive relief, United did not
pursue the lawsuit further.
15. "An open-ended inquiry or investigation, often undertaken on thepretext of a minor or unrelated matter, whose real purpose is to uncover em-
barrassing or damaging information, as about a political opponent." MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993).
16. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, No. C.A. 04-5942,
2004 WL 2821629, at *3-16 (R.I. Super. Dec. 1, 2004) (recounting hundreds of
pages of depositions taken by Blue Cross).
17. The Chief Purchasing Officer is the Director of the Department of
Administration. See R.I. GEN. LAwS § 37-2-7 (1997).
18. Najarian, 2004 WL 2821629, at *24, rev'd, 865 A.2d 1074 (R.I. 2005).19. The superior court overturned the award to United shortly before the
expiration of the State's health care contract on December 31, 2004. Id. BlueCross did not have a contractual obligation to continue to provide health care
administration to the State, and the provision of health care services to
52,000 individuals was put in jeopardy. The supreme court subsequently in-
tervened to assure that Blue Cross would continue to provide health care
administration throughout the duration of the appeal at the amount of itsproposal made in the Request for Proposal (RFP). See generally Najarian, 865
A.2d 1074.
20. See Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1091.
21. Id.
22. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v Bd. of Trus. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 399(R.I. 1970).
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people23 was put at risk.24 Limiting the scope of review in bid pro-
test litigation would be consistent with the APA, and would
streamline cases brought by disgruntled losing bidders, such as
Blue Cross.
This Article discusses the inconsistency between the Purchas-
ing Act and the APA, which has led to continuous bid protest liti-
gation in the Rhode Island Supreme Court and a waste of
government resources. Section I provides a background of bid pro-
test litigation to illustrate the extremely high burden required to
overturn a government procurement decision, the amount of def-
erence given to purchasing officials by the supreme court, and the
frivolousness of bid protest litigation in its current form. Section II
discusses the bid process in the context of the recent awarding of
the State health care contract to United. Section II also discusses
in detail the bid protest controversy between the State and Blue
Cross, and the resulting strain placed on the government in de-
fending these lawsuits. Section III provides specific recommenda-
tions regarding the Purchasing Act, and concludes that this
statute should be amended to limit the scope of review consistent
with the APA.
I. BACKGROUND
State officials are entitled to a "presumption of correctness" in
awarding state contracts. Rhode Island General Law section 37-2-
51 provides:
The decision of any official, board, agent, or other person
appointed by the state concerning any controversy arising
under or in connection with the solicitation or award of a
contract shall be entitled to a presumption of correctness.
The decision shall not be disturbed unless it was: pro-
cured by fraud; in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; made upon unlawful procedure; affected by other
error of law; clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, pro-
23. The 52,000 included employees, eligible dependants, and retirees.
Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1076.
24. The State health care contract expired on December 31, 2004, and
Blue Cross was not contractually obligated to continue coverage after that
date.
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bative and substantial evidence on the whole record; arbi-
trary, capricious; characterized by an abuse of discretion;
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 25
A procurement decision may only be reversed if State pur-
chasing officials acted with bad faith, corruption, or a "palpable
abuse of discretion."26 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has nar-
rowed this standard by declaring that a "finding of palpable abuse
of discretion should be approached with grave caution and be
based upon much more compelling evidence of arbitrariness or ca-
priciousness than may be found in mere complexity."27
The purpose of such a difficult burden set forth by the legisla-
ture in section 37-2-51 is to avoid placing State officials in a "legal-
istic straightjacket," by having to continually justify their
procurement decisions to trial court judges.28 The logic is that los-
25. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-21 (1997) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the
standard of review in the state's APA is extremely similar to that in the
Rhode Island Purchasing Act (Purchasing Act), without the procedural limi-
tations. The APA does not include a presumption of correctness, but all the
other aspects of the Purchasing Act and APA are consistent. Section 42-35-
15(g) of the APA states:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may af-
firm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further pro-
ceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administra-
tive findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id. § 4 2 -35-15(g).
26. H.V. Collins Co. v. Tarro, 696 A.2d 298, 301 (R.I. 1997); Truk Away of
R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc., 643 A.2d 811, 816 (R.I. 1994); Gil-
bane Bldg. Co. v Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I. 1970);
Goldman, Inc. v. Burns, 283 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I. 1970).
27. Truk Away, 643 A.2d at 816 (emphasis added).
28. Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 400. A second reason for discouraging interfer-
ence with the procurement process is to avoid placing superior court judges in
the shoes of purchasing officials. Id.
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ing bidders may be deterred from filing suit when faced with such
a difficult standard. However, despite the "presumption of cor-
rectness" mandated by the legislature, losing bidders have contin-
ued to challenge procurement decisions in court. 29 Amazingly,
despite the supreme court's clear precedent, harsh language and
explicit admonitions, superior court judges have continued to in-
terfere with purchasing decisions.30 Public purchasing officials are
forced to concentrate their energies on defending their judgment
rather than on receiving the best value for the taxpayer's dollar.
A. Gilbane and its Progeny
The seminal case of Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State
Colls.31 was the first in a long line of cases addressing bid protest
litigation in Rhode Island. In this 1970 case, the supreme court
began to set a clear precedent mandating that the decision of a
procurement official should not be disturbed absent bad faith, cor-
ruption, or a "palpable abuse of discretion."32 Unfortunately, supe-
rior court justices have failed to abide by the precedent set by
Gilbane and its progeny.
1. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls. 33
Gilbane Bldg. Company (Gilbane) brought a lawsuit challeng-
ing a State contract award to Dimeo Construction Company (Di-
meo).34 Dimeo was contracted to construct a junior college facility
in Warwick, Rhode Island for the sum of $10,701,000.35 In Novem-
ber 1968, the State's Purchasing Agent solicited bids for this pro-
ject. The bid invitation required a complex scheme requiring
bidders to submit alternate bids. These alternate bids were for
"extras" that the State might include in the project depending on
the amount of the base bid.36 Dimeo's initial bid was $9,675,000
29. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, No. C.A. 04-
5942, 2004 WL 2821629, at *15 (R.I. Super. Dec. 1, 2004). Losing bidders may
be concerned more with their public appearance in losing a bid to a competi-
tor than wasting resources in a nearly frivolous lawsuit.
30. Id. at *23-24.
31. 267 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1970).
32. Id. at 399.
33. 267 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1970).
34. Id. at 397
35. Id.
36. Id. The alternative options included items such as carpeting, folding
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and Gilbane's bid was $11,211,000. Unbeknownst to Dimeo's
President, two of the sub-bidders seeking sub-contract work on the
project withdrew their bids. When Dimeo's President discovered
this oversight, he immediately contacted the State. Dimeo's base
bid was subsequently amended to an amount of $9,937,000. After
a decision was made to allow Dimeo to further amend its bid to in-
clude the "extras," the State entered into a contract with Dimeo
for $10,701,000 on January 8, 1969. 37
On March 14, 1969, Gilbane brought suit challenging the
award to Dimeo.38 Gilbane argued that a public official does not
have the authority to change the terms of a bid once it is un-
sealed.39 The court, however, thought differently: "We do not be-
lieve that any person charged with the responsibility of
safeguarding the public interest should have his discretion shack-
led once bids are opened."40 The Gilbane Court upheld the award
to Dimeo and espoused the following principle:
The judiciary will interfere with an award only when it is
shown that an officer or officers charged with the duty of
making a decision has acted corruptly or in bad faith, or
so unreasonably or so arbitrarily as to be guilty of a pal-
pable abuse of discretion.41
The court continued: '"e do not believe, however, that those
whose duty it is to contract for ... public improvement should be
placed in a legalistic straightjacket."42 Unfortunately, because the
constraints imposed by the APA in challenging agency decisions
do not apply to procurement decisions, state officials have been
constructively "shackled" and placed in a "legalistic straight-
jacket" by bid protest litigation. 43
partitions, a standby pump and a television system. Id.
37. Id. at 397-98.
38. Id. at 398.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 399.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 400.
43. See id. at 399-400. The effects of bid protest litigation on the State
will be examined below. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
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2. Paul Goldman, Inc. v. Burns44
Shortly after Gilbane, the Rhode Island Supreme Court heard
another bid protest suit in 1971. In Goldman, the City of Paw-
tucket, had an established provision in its municipal code stating
a policy that all bids would be awarded to the "lowest responsible
bidder."45 The contract at issue was for the purchase of thirteen
motor vehicles for use by the Pawtucket Police Department. 46 Af-
ter the invitation for bids in August 1970, two bidders responded:
Paul Goldman Dodge (Goldman) and Pierce Chevrolet, Inc.
(Pierce). Goldman's bid was for thirteen Dodge automobiles at a
price of $39,450.00, while Pierce's bid was $39,976.98 for thirteen
Chevrolets. 47 These bids were considered a week later by the Paw-
tucket Purchasing Board (Pawtucket Board) in an executive ses-
sion.48 The Chief of Police was in attendance by invitation. 49
Despite Goldman's lower price (by $526.98), the Police Chief rec-
ommended the acceptance of Pierce's bid based on the following
factors: 1) the existing thirty-three vehicles in the fleet were all
Chevrolets and therefore, by awarding the bid to Pierce all the ve-
hicles would be kept uniform; 2) the Chiefs experience with the
current fleet of Chevrolets was "most satisfactory"; 3) parts and
service were more easily attainable for the Chevrolets; and 4) hav-
ing a different type of vehicle added to the fleet would require the
additional expense of stocking different types of parts.50 Based on
these recommendations, the Pawtucket Board accepted the higher
Pierce bid despite the City's stated policy of awarding a bid to the
lowest bidder.51 Goldman brought suit.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, citing Gilbane, held that
the Pawtucket Board acted honestly and in good faith in following
the Chiefs recommendations. 52 Although the City's policy was to
44. 283 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1971).
45. Id. at 675 (citing PAWTUCKET, R.I., CHARTER § 4-1004 (1954)). In this
case, there was no argument that either of the companies were irresponsible
bidders. Id.




50. Id. at 675.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 676.
20051
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accept the lowest bid, the court read the municipal provision as to
permit the "awarding authority to exercise a reasonable, good-
faith discretion, and does not commit it unqualifiedly to the lowest
bid."53 Once again, the court upheld the decision of a purchasing
authority; this came however, only after many resources were
wasted as Pawtucket defended its decision in the superior and su-
preme courts.
3. Truk Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc.54
The next landmark case involving a bid challenge was in
1994. 55 In Truk Away, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed
a bid controversy where the superior court judge overturned the
decision of the purchasing officer.56 Truk Away involved a dispute
over a sanitation contract awarded by a municipality. The trial
court in Truk Away held that the bid submitted by Macera Bros. of
Cranston, Inc. (Macera) did not conform to the bid specifications
and, therefore, Macera's bid should not have been considered the
lowest responsible bid.57 The trial court also found that the bid
submitted by Truk Away of Rhode Island, Inc. (Truk Away) did
not meet specifications.58 As a result, the trial judge granted in-
junctive relief against the award to Macera and further rejected
all bids.59 The supreme court accepted all the facts found by the
trial court, including the fact that there was no evidence of bad
faith or corruption on behalf of city officials. 60 As a result, the su-
preme court reversed the lower court and awarded the contract to
53. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Walden Motor Co., 177 So. 151 (Ala. 1937);
Hodgeman v. San Diego, 128 P.2d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); McNichols v. City
and County of Denver, 274 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1954); Eggart v. Westmark, 45
So.2d 505 (Fla. 1950); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Elbow Lake, 49 N.W.2d 197
(Minn. 1951); 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.73(a), at 430 (3d
ed. 1966)).
54. 643 A.2d 811 (R.I. 1994).
55. The issue of a bid challenge was in the courts on other occasions prior
to 1994. See Patrick J. McKenna Roofing, Inc. v. City of Pawtucket, No. C.A.
88-3120, 1988 WL 1017215, at *1 (R.I. Super. Sept. 13, 1988); see also Myberg
Janitorial Serv., Inc. v. Cianci, No. C.A. 82-3405, 1982 WL 609160, at *1 (R.I.
Super. Oct. 29, 1982).
56. Truk Away, 643 A.2d at 812.
57. Id. at 814.
58. Id. at 812-13.
59. Id. at 812.
60. Id. at 816.
THE RHODE ISLAND PURCHASING ACT
Truk Away.61
In this case, the harsh language used by the supreme court in
its decision is indicative of the burden faced by a losing bidder in
challenging a contract award. The court stated that a "finding of
palpable abuse of discretion should be approached with grave cau-
tion and be based upon much more compelling evidence of arbi-
trariness or capriciousness than may be found in mere
complexity."62 The court's decision explicitly "admonish[ed] all jus-
tices of the Superior Court to exercise great care before issuing an
injunction vacating an award of either a state or municipal con-
tract."63 In reaffirming the principles set forth in both Goldman
and Gilbane, the court expressed its belief that "government by in-
junction save the most compelling and unusual circumstances is to
be strictly avoided."64 Despite these austere warnings, the court
again would be forced to hear the same issue three years later,
and yet again more recently.65
For the first time in Truk Away, the court addressed a prob-
lem with the procedural construct of a bid protest case. The court
recognized that the litigation was introduced by the attorney of an
unsuccessful bidder cross-examining members of the city council
and other city officials.63 The court acknowledged that the "inher-
ent nature of cross-examination is such that it is designed to bring
out inconsistencies and to emphasize ambiguities."6 7 Through the
ability to cross-examine witnesses, the attorney for the challeng-
ing bidder succeeded in "creating a sufficient aura of confusion as
to cause the trial justice to vacate the award."68 In summary, al-
lowing the cross-examination of government officials not only
places them in a "legalistic straightjacket" in the course of defend-
ing these suits, but it also provides an inappropriate forum for los-
ing bidders to create confusion in an attempt to show that a
competitor should not be awarded a contract.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. H.V. Collins Co. v. Tarro, 696 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1997); Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1091 (R.I. 2005).
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4. H.V. Collins Co. v. Tarro 69
Just three years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court again
was obliged to review bid protest litigation by a losing bidder in
H.V. Collins.70 The issue involved a municipal contract awarded to
the third lowest bidder.71 In the spring of 1996, the Barrington
School Committee (School Committee) created a building commit-
tee to plan a major renovation at Barrington High School.72 In
September 1996, the School Committee voted to hire a construc-
tion manager and issue a request for proposal.73 The lowest bidder
was H.V. Collins Company (Collins).74 However, the building
committee recommended that Gilbane, the third lowest bidder be
awarded the contract. The School Committee followed the recom-
mendation and awarded Gilbane the contract. 75 Collins filed a
lawsuit the next day.76
The superior court, after a trial, issued a declaratory judg-
ment in favor of Collins. The trial court found that: (1) Collins was
the lowest responsive bidder; (2) Gilbane's bid was non-responsive
and should have been rejected; (3) the evaluation of bids was "sub-jective, unfair, and included matters outside the criteria in the
RFP"; (4) the conduct by the school committee was unreasonable
and constituted a "'palpable abuse of discretion."77 The School
Committee claimed that, among other reasons, it selected Gilbane
because Gilbane had the most experience and had completed past
69. 696 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1997).
70. Interestingly the two other bidders involved in this case were Gilbane
and Dimeo, the same two parties involved twenty-seven years earlier in Gil-bane. However, it is not uncommon for the same parties to be on opposites
sides of bid protest litigation as these companies are often competing against
each other for State contracts. The recent Blue Cross litigation is an example.In November 2004, the State's health care contract was awarded to United,
and Blue Cross brought suit. Four years earlier when Blue Cross was
awarded the prior health care contract, United brought suit. The superior
court did not issue injunctive relief. Hearing Transcript at 93, United Health-
care, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island (No. PC/01-6794) (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Hearing Transcript]. After superior court judge Silverstein denied
United's injunction, United dropped the matter.




75. Id. at 300.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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projects for the School Committee. 78
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the findings of the
trial court, holding that the "award of the contract by the School
Committee will not be disturbed."79 The court found the school
committee's actions reflected good faith and the committee used
sound discretion. 80 In overturning the lower court's decision, the
supreme court "reaffirmed the standard set forth in Gilbane,
Goldman, and Truk Away, that 'when public officials in charge of
awarding a public works contract have acted fairly and honestly
with reasonable exercise of sound discretion, their actions shall
not be interfered with by the courts."'81 Further, the court fore-
warned: "To hold otherwise would place the Judiciary in the posi-
tion of litigating the award of every state and municipal contract
and would place public officials in charge of awarding such con-
tracts in the 'legalistic straightjacket' that this Court denounced
almost twenty-seven years ago."8 2 For a second time in three
years, the supreme court reversed and expressly warned the lower
courts to avoid interfering with a purchasing decision except in ex-
treme cases.
The precedent established since Gilbane and the express
warnings in Truk Away and H.V. Collins would go unheeded
again, just a few years later, in the Blue Cross litigation.83 Bid
protest cases continue to clog the courts, waste government re-
sources and tie the hands of purchasing officials, all of which ul-
timately place a burden on the taxpayer. In this major line of
cases, the end result was the same: the initial decision of the pur-
chasing authority was sustained, but only after expensive, time-
consuming litigation. As demonstrated again in the below discus-
sion of the Blue Cross case, the demands of presenting a defense
in bid protest litigation - despite the extreme odds of success in
these cases - place a significant strain on local government offi-
cials. Introduction of limitations on these suits, similar to those in
78. Id. at 302.
79. Id. at 305.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Truk Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc.,
643 A.2d 811, 815 (R.I. 1994)).
82. Id. (citing Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d
396, 400 (R.I. 1970)).
83. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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the APA, would relieve some of this burden.
B. The APA Does Not Apply to Bid Protest Litigation
In several other states, bid protests fall under the APA for
that state.84 In Rhode Island, however, the APA does not apply to
bid protest litigation. The APA only applies to "contested cases."85
If a losing bidder wishes to protest a state contract award, a bid
protest letter must be sent to the Chief Purchasing Officer, pursu-
ant to the Purchasing Act.86 The Chief Purchasing Officer then re-
sponds to the losing bidder's allegations in a bid protest response
letter.87 The Purchasing Act and the purchasing regulations do not
provide for a hearing at the agency level.88 The absence of a hear-
ing determines whether the APA applies. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court has held that a hearing is required to create a
"contested case."89 Therefore, the losing bidder can file a lawsuit in
superior court free from any constraints imposed by the APA.
This situation creates a paradox: a higher burden exists in a
bid protest court challenge of an agency determination than under
the APA, yet the same procedural limitations provided under the
APA do not apply under a bid protest challenge. Additionally, the
process for awarding a contract is extremely comprehensive and
may take months. 90 Allowing such a process to be challenged in
courts without the limitation of the APA places a superior court
84. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-4410 (5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 120.57(3) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-56-57 (2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4360 (A) (Michie 2001).
85. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(a) (Supp. 2004). The APA defines a "con-
tested case" as "a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking,
price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a
specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an op-
portunity for hearing.. . ." Id. § 42-35-1(c) (emphasis added).
86. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-52(b) (1997).
87. See id. § 37-2-52(c).
88. See Bradford Assocs. v. R.I. Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 491 (R.I.
2001).
89. Prop. Advisory Group, Inc. v. Rylant, 636 A.2d 317, 318 (R.I. 1994)(citing Barrington School Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d
1126, 1131 (R.I. 1992); Lynch v. Gontarz, 386 A.2d 184, 187 (R.I. 1978);
Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 380 A.2d 1334, 1342 (R.I. 1977); Newport Nat'l
Bank v. Providence Inst. for Sav., 226 A.2d 137, 141 (R.I. 1967)).
90. For example, the process to award the state health care contract be-
gan almost six months before the expiration of the current contract. See BlueCross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 2005).
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judge in the position of the Chief Purchasing Officer, rather than
in the appropriate role of a court of review. Moreover, the superior
court is in a worse position than purchasing officials because the
judge is being presented with facts largely through depositions
conducted by skillful attorneys on behalf of a losing bidder.
91 The
latest award of the State health care contract and the ensuing liti-
gation between Blue Cross and the State provide a prime example
of the detrimental effect of bid protest litigation without proce-
dural limitations on judicial review of administrative decisions.
II. STATE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. Background
The State of Rhode Island provides health insurance to all
full-time state employees, 92 their dependents
93 and to retirees94
(collectively, "eligible employees"). The Director of the Department
of Administration (DOA), through its Division of Purchasing, se-
lects a health insurance provider for eligible employees. 9
5 As of
December 31, 2004, more than 52,000 eligible employees were
covered under the State's health care plan.
96
91. See Truk Away of R.I. v. Macera Bros. Of Cranston, 643 A.2d 811,
816 (R.I. 1994).
92. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-7 (1997). The statutory definition of "em-
ployee" is unclear: "'Employee' means all persons who are classified employ-
ees, as the term 'classified employee' is defined under § 36-3-3, and all
persons in the unclassified and non-classified service of the state; provided,
however, that the following shall not be included as 'employees' under §§ 36-
12-1 - 36-12-14." Id. § 36-12-1. Employees with a work week of at least
twenty hours are covered under the state's health care plan. See id.
93. R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-12-1(3) (Supp. 2004).
94. Id. § 36-12-4.
95. R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-12-6 (1997). Although the Department of Ad-
ministration (DOA) can procure a health insurance plan from any plan ad-
ministrator, id. § 36-12-6(b), it may not alter the plan design for unionized
employees outside of the collective bargaining process. Id. § 36-12-2.
96. The State's health care plan for active employees is a self-insured
model, under which the state pays all medical claims and contracts with a
third-party administrator to handle the day-to-day operation of the plan. See
Liz Anderson, State Dumps Blue Cross, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 7, 2004. The ser-
vices provided by a third-party administrator may include: the establishment
and maintenance of the provider network; negotiation of provider discounts;
processing of claims; dispute resolution; and compliance with federal and
state laws and regulations. The health care plans for retirees are a combina-
tion of self-insured and fully insured plans. Under the fully insured plans, the
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During the spring of 2000, the State issued a Request for Pro-
posals (RFP) to procure a self-insured medical insurance plan for
eligible employees, and a fully insured medical plan for certain re-
tirees. As opposed to prior health insurance awards by the State
where several insurance companies were awarded the contract,
this solicitation allowed the award of the entire contract to an in-
dividual successful bidder.97 Two insurance companies responded
to the State's RFP: Blue Cross and United. Each proposal was
then evaluated by a subcommittee98 which determined that
United's bid was non-responsive, and therefore ineligible for con-
sideration. The Architectural, Engineering, and Consultant Ser-
vices Committee (A & E Committee) voted unanimously to award
the health care contract to Blue Cross. 99 This recommendation
was thereafter approved by the Chief Purchasing Officer/Director
of the DOA (Director),100 and the contract was awarded to Blue
Cross for a three year period beginning January 1, 2002, through
December 31, 2004.101
After the contract was awarded, United filed a bid protest in
accordance with Rhode Island General Law section 37-2-52(b), al-
leging violations of the Purchasing Act. The bid protest was de-
nied by the Director.102 United then filed a lawsuit in superior
court, requesting a temporary restraining order (TRO), to prevent
the implementation of the Blue Cross award. After considering the
filed briefs and subsequent oral arguments, the superior court de-
nied United's request and allowed the Blue Cross award to be im-
plemented.103 United, after this decision, no longer pursued the
State pays a premium to the insurance company which then pays all claims
and handles the administration of the medical plan.
97. Awarding a service contract to one company instead of several is
known as a "whole case" award.
98. This subcommittee was formed by the Architectural, Engineering,
and Consultant Services Committee (A & E Committee).
99. The A & E Committee is statutory in origin. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-
2-59 (1997).
100. The process of selecting firms for discussion with the Chief Purchas-ing Officer is mandated by statute. See id. § 37-2-63. The Chief Purchasing
Officer is the Director of the DOA.
101. Brief of Appellant app. 4 at 124, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v.Najarian, No. C.A. 04-5942, 2004 WL 2821629 (R.I. Super. Dec. 1, 2004)[hereinafter Brief of Appellant I] (citing Trial Exhibit B); see also Blue Cross& Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 2005).
102. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-52(c) (1997).
103. Judge Silverstein relied heavily on Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of State
THE RHODE ISLAND PURCHASING ACT
lawsuit filed against the state.
In January 2002, newly elected Governor, Donald L. Carcieri,
undertook a comprehensive review of how government services
are provided to its citizens. The Governor termed this review "Fis-
cal Fitness."104 The purpose of the Governor's Fiscal Fitness pro-
gram was, and still is, to find ways of providing a more efficient
and cost effective government for the taxpayers of Rhode Island.
0 5
The Fiscal Fitness staff discovered that the State was overpaying
for employee health care coverage, and that the structure and
costs of the program should be comprehensively examined prior to
the expiration of the contract with Blue Cross. 10 6 The Fiscal Fit-
ness staff also determined that the specialized expertise required
for evaluating and drafting a proposal and implementing a new
health care plan did not currently exist within state govern-
ment. 0 7
Following the Fiscal Fitness recommendation, the State is-
sued an RFP seeking a health care consultant to assist in: 1)
evaluating the current health care plan; 2) preparing the health
care plan RFP; 3) evaluating the submitted proposals; 4) negotiat-
ing the contract; and 5) implementing the new plan. 08 Three con-
sulting firms submitted qualifying bids to become the State's
consultant. 09 These bids were evaluated by the State, and the
Colls., 267 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1970), and Truk Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of
Cranston, Inc., 643 A.2d 811 (R.I. 1994), and the State's "presumption of cor-
rectness" in making his determination. Hearing Transcript, supra note 70, at
93-94.
104. The Governor's Fiscal Fitness Program was a result of a cornerstone
of the Governor's campaign promise to conduct "The Big Audit" of state gov-
ernment in Rhode Island. See Jack Perry, Cacieri Unveils "Fiscal Fitness"
Program, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 22, 2003.
105. See Perry, supra note 104.
106. See Press Release: Governor's "Fiscal Fitness" Audit Details $180 Mil-
lion in Potential Savings, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 5, 2004 [hereinafter Press Re-
lease].
107. The Fiscal Fitness staff further decided that the best financial alter-
native was to retain an outside consultant rather than hire state employees
to perform this task. See Press Release, supra note 106.
108. Request for Proposal, Employee Benefits and Consulting Services #
B03136 at 2, 4 (Nov. 17, 2003) (on file with author).
109. Memorandum from the Technical Review Subcommittee to Peter S.
Corr, Chairman of the Architectural, Engineering, and Consultant Services
Selection Committee at 1, 3 (Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter A & E Memorandum]
(on file with author).
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evaluation sub-committee11° recommended Hewitt Associates
(Hewitt) to the A & E Committee based on a series of economic
and non-economic factors."' The A & E Committee unanimously
recommended that Hewitt be awarded the contract, and the Direc-
tor accepted this recommendation.112 Thus, the State acquired the
services of a health care consultant to provide an expert and inde-
pendent voice in selection of a health care provider. With the as-
sistance of Hewitt, the State then undertook a comprehensive
process in selecting a health care insurance provider.
B. The Procurement Process for the Current Health Care Contract
A team of State employees from a variety of departments and
disciplines,13 along with representatives from the State Division
of Purchasing, was formed by the Director to work with Hewitt to
evaluate the current health care contract and to draft the health
care RFP." 4 The team drafted, and the State issued, a comprehen-
sive RFP of approximately 90 pages.1 5 The RFP included more
than 100 economic and technical criteria for consideration, and a
110. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, No. C.A. 04-5942,
2004 WL 2821629, at *3 (R.I. Super. Dec. 1, 2004). The A & E Committee
formed the subcommittee. See id.
111. See id. Six consulting firms submitted bids, but only three bidders
were qualified. See A & E Memorandum, supra note 109, at 3. Hewitt Associ-
ates was the highest cost of the three bidders; however, the subcommittee de-
termined Hewitt to be the most qualified based upon the evaluation criteria.
See Minutes of the Architectural, Engineering, and Consultant Services Se-lection Committee (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter A & E Minutes] (on file with
author).
112. See Interoffice Memorandum from Beverly E. Najarian, Director, to
Peter S. Corr, Chairman of Architectural, Engineering, and Consultant Ser-
vices Selection Committee (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with author); see also A &
E Minutes, supra note 111, at 1-2.
113. These disciplines included state purchasing, personnel, employeebenefits, pharmaceuticals, health, human services, labor relations and
budget.
114. The team's goal was to create an RFP that would solicit a bid for a
plan containing a similar design as the current health care plan, with some
major differences including: (1) administrative fees paid to the provider
would be based on a per employee per month calculation rather than per-
centage of claims; (2) the successful bidder would be required to agree to put
certain fees at risk based on specific performance measures; (3) the successful
bidder would be requested to offer the same terms to municipalities; and (4)
the same or better pharmaceutical benefits must be offered.
115. See generally Trial Exhibit D, Najarian, 2004 WL 2821629 at app. 6(No. C.A. 03-5942).
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complex rating system to compare the bid submissions. 116 Prior to
the bid opening, several vendors attended a pre-bid conference.
The pre-bid conference was a forum for potential bidders to ask
clarifying questions about the contents of this complex RFP. The
creation of an in-depth, comprehensive RFP was the first step in
making sure the State would procure the best plan possible.
On August 12, 2004, in response to the RFP, the State re-
ceived more than 2,000 pages of documents from two bidders, Blue
Cross and United, which were opened by Purchasing. 1 7 These
proposals were then forwarded to the evaluation committee."1
8
Hewitt assisted the evaluation committee by performing high level
data analysis, verifying representations made by the bidders and
applying its proprietary information and data models, which it in-
cluded in a detailed 120 page analysis of the two proposals. 1' 9 Af-
ter the committee independently evaluated the proposals and
reviewed Hewitt's analysis, the evaluation committee reached the
conclusion that the technical and cost criteria were close enough
in range that the "best and final" economic offers should be re-
quested from each bidder before a final recommendation was
submitted to the A & E Committee. 20
On September 20, 2004 the Director determined that there
116. Id.
117. During the evaluation process, a series of written questions were
emailed to both bidders clarifying certain portions of each bid. Additionally,
the evaluation committee held several tape recorded conference calls with
both bidders to further clarify the complex nature of the bids. The superior
court judge later inferred, without any evidence, that these communications
were of an inappropriate nature. Najarian, 2004 WL 2821629, at *21 ("[Pur-
chasing Agent] Anderson's email to United, seeking so-called clarification...
was nothing more than a suggestion to the offeror that United reconsider the
additional fee and remove it."). The supreme court clearly recognized this
mischaracterization by the lower court: "Upon careful review of the record,
we conclude that the trial justice misconceived material evidence and that
the State's communication with United was, in fact, a request for clarifica-
tion, permitted by the act, and indeed an obligation of public officials." Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1089 (R.I. 2005).
118. Anthony Bucci, Joseph Cembrola, Beatrice Frazer, Stephen Johnston,
Paul Larrat, Melanie Marcaccio, Jerome Williams, and John Young com-
prised the evaluation committee. See Brief of Appellant I, supra note 101,
app. 26 at 774 (citing Trial exhibit X).
119. See Brief of Appellant I, supra note 101, app. 23 at 645-765 (citing
Trial Exhibit U).
120. R.I. Dep't of Admin., Procurement Regs. § 6.3.4,
http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/DOA/DOA_539_.pdf.
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were no additional funds available from any source to permit the
award to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder, 121 and the
best interest of the State did not permit a re-bidding.122 Both Blue
Cross and United submitted "best and final" offers to the State.
The evaluation committee reviewed the "best and final" offers and
determined, by consensus, that a recommendation awarding the
contract to United be sent to the A & E Committee.123 The evalua-
tion committee determined: (1) United's bid was $8.4 million less
in administrative fees during the contract term; (2) United al-
lowed cities and towns to utilize the State contract; (3) United in-
cluded more favorable performance guarantees; (4) United's offer
guaranteed pharmaceutical rebates during the contract term; (5)
United pharmaceutical network consisted of all Rhode Island
pharmacies; and (6) United offered extensive and in-depth report-
ing capabilities.124 The State exhaustively evaluated both propos-
als with the intent of acquiring the best plan possible for the
taxpayers.
In accordance with statute, the A & E Committee held a pub-
lic meeting125 to consider the report and recommendations of the
evaluation committee. 26 The A & E Committee consisted of an
121. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-15 (Supp. 2004).
122. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-23 (1997).
123. Brief of Appellant I, supra note 101, app. 26 at 773 (citing Trial Ex-
hibit X). This report concluded that the overall proposal score for United was
81.1 points versus 74.9 points for Blue Cross. Id.
124. Id. at 776 (citing Trial Exhibit X).
125. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-46-3 (1997).
126. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-59(b) (Supp. 2004). This provision of the Pur-
chasing Act creates the A & E Committee and states: "Except for architec-
tural, engineering and consultant services which can be solicited and
awarded in accordance with the requirements for competitive sealed offers
set forth in §§ 37-2-18 - 37-2-19 of this chapter, a selection committee shall
select persons or firms to render such professional services." Id. This provi-
sion is unclear because it does not clearly define which 'professional services"
fall under "architectural, engineering, and consultant services." See id. § 37-
2-59(a). This ambiguity has led the State Purchasing Division to often use an
A & E Committee in procurements over $20,000 where it is unclear that the
legislature intended for the A & E Committee to be used. See id. § 37-2-7(26).
In fact, it is unclear whether the State health care contract awarded to
United falls under "architectural, engineering, and consultant services" and
should have even required a vote by this committee. See id. § 37-2-59(b).
Moreover, the law and regulations are unclear on the scope of the A
& E Committee's authority. See id. § 37-2-59. In many instances, such as in
the procurement of health care contract, a subcommittee is formed to do most
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acting chairperson, 127 an agency representative from the DOA 128
and a designated public member. 29 During the A & E Committee's
hearing, presentations were made by the DOA representative,
with the assistance of a representative of the State's consultant,
Hewitt. 30 At the end of the hearing, the A & E Committee voted to
recommend to the DOA Director that United be awarded the con-
tract. After considering the recommendation of the A & E Com-
mittee, the Director adopted the recommendation' 3' and
tentatively awarded United the health care contract. Purchasing
of the analysis and provide a recommendation to the three-member A & E
Committee. The A & E Committee then reviews the recommendation prior to
and during the public hearing, and then immediately votes to either approve
or reject the recommendation at the time of the hearing.
Finally, members of the A & E Committee serve on the subcommittee
that ultimately makes a recommendation to the three person panel. Because
there are only three members, and therefore only three votes, a member act-
ing on both a subcommittee and the committee may cause a conflict. Two pos-
sible solutions are to either increase the number of members on the A & E
Committee or to exclude the A & E Committee member from serving on the
subcommittee.
127. The Purchasing Agent who serves as the Chair, pursuant to R.I. GEN.
LAwS § 37-2-59 (Supp. 2004), was on extended leave at the time of the meet-
ing, and William Anderson, Administrator of Purchasing Systems, was des-
ignated Acting Chairperson by the Chief Purchasing Officer.
128. Stephen Johnston, Deputy Director of the Department of Administra-
tion.
129. Dr. DeTarnowsky, a holdover appointment by Governor Almond in
accordance with R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-59 (Supp. 2004). The public member's
term runs concurrent with the term of the Governor. Id. However, at the
time, Governor Carcieri had not yet appointed a new public member and,
therefore, Dr. DeTarnowsky continued to serve as a "holdover."
130. During the meeting the public member raised concerns about the
evaluation committees' recommendation concerning "stop loss" coverage. Spe-
cifically, the public member was concerned that the evaluation committee
was not recommending "stop loss" coverage and this was not being communi-
cated to the bidders. ("Stop loss" coverage is a form of insurance purchased by
some self-insured health care plans to limit the risk that the self-insured plan
will have to bear exposure over a certain monetary amount.) The RFP asked
that bidders provide proposals as to the cost of "stop loss" coverage for the
State to consider when making the award, but noted that "stop loss" might be
carved out of the bid.
When the evaluation committee's recommendation was brought to a
vote, the public member voted against the award to United based on the "stop
loss" issue. The vote of the A&E Committee was 2-1 in favor of recommending
to the Director of Administration that an award be made to United.
131. In the Director's letter adopting the recommendation, she determined
that the concerns of the public member were without merit.
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subsequently issued a tentative letter of award. 132
The evaluation process lasted several months and entailed
several layers of review by a diversity of individuals. The State re-
lied heavily on the expertise of Hewitt, although State officials in-
dependently reviewed both proposals. The ultimate decision to
award the contract to United was not made lightly; however, any
significant governmental procurement process, in the hands of an
experienced law firm, can be undermined through depositions and
cross-examination. 133 Blue Cross, as the losing bidder of a mam-
moth contract to a competitor, officially protested this award.
C. The Bid Protest and Ensuing Litigation
In accordance with Rhode Island General Law section 37-2-
52, Blue Cross filed a bid protest contesting the State's award to
United. 34 In its bid protest, Blue Cross raised several arguments
in support of reversing the tentative award: (1) The cost of the
Blue Cross proposal was the lowest; (2) the State compared "ma-
ture fees" rather than "immature fees" as stated in the RFP; (3)
retirees would pay additional costs under the United bid; (4)
Medicare crossover adjudication services were not included in
United's bid; and (5) the bid process performed by the State vio-
lated the law and requisite procedure. 35 After evaluating the Blue
Cross bid protest, the Director found that the allegations made by
Blue Cross were unfounded and did not rise to the level of over-
turning the award. 36 A nine page written response was sent to
132. Brief of Appellant app. 30 at 792, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v.
Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074 (R.I. 2005) (No. 04-361-A) [hereinafter Brief of Ap-
pellant II]. The award was tentative because it required United to submit
certain documentation to the state certifying that: (1) it was a responsible
bidder in accordance with R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-15(6) (Supp. 2004); (2) obtain
the required regulatory approvals; and (3) enter into a contract with the
State. See id.
133. See Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1084 ("We are quite certain that '[any
good lawyer can pick lint off any Government Procurement...."' quoting
Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
134. Prior to filing a formal bid protest, the acting President of Blue Cross
sent a letter to Governor Carcieri requesting that he intervene and award the
State's health care contract to Blue Cross, or, in the alternative, allow state
employees to choose between the Blue Cross and United health care plans.
Brief of Appellant II, supra note 132, app. 31 at 793. Prior to the Governor
responding to the letter, Blue Cross filed a formal bid protest.
135. Id. app. 32 at 797-806.
136. Brief of Appellant I, supra note 101, app. 34 at 808-16. The Director
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Blue Cross. 137
1. Blue Cross Files a Complaint and Motion for a TRO and a
Permanent Injunction with the Superior Court
Several days after the Director denied the bid protest, Blue
Cross filed a complaint in the superior court seeking to restrain
the State from entering into a contract with United and issuing a
purchase order.138 Although the Director is entitled to a "presump-
tion of correctness" 139 and may only be reversed by the court in
cases of corruption, bad faith or "palpable abuse of discretion," 40
the Blue Cross complaint alleged that the tentative award should
be reversed.'4 ' In support of its application for a TRO, Blue Cross
raised the same issues as it did in its bid protest to the Director,
including the alleged non-responsive bid, errors in the evaluation
of the proposals and violations of the purchasing statute and pro-
cedural rules. 42
Superior court Judge Daniel A. Procaccini granted United's
application to intervene in the litigation, and permitted all parties
to file legal briefs and present oral arguments on whether a TRO
should be issued. In delivering its oral opinion on the TRO, the
court spent a substantial amount of time during its oral decision
reciting the statutory provision providing for a "presumption of
correctness," and the strongly worded language within supreme
court precedent which cautions the superior court from interfering
with a procurement decision. 143 The court determined that Blue
Cross had failed to meet its burden of a "likelihood of success on
the merits" of its claim, and denied the request for a TRO.14 Re-
addressed every issue raised by Blue Cross and denied Blue Cross's bid pro-
test: "The State acted in good faith, complied with all of the purchasing stat-
utes, regulations, and processes, and fairly awarded [the health care
contract] to United Healthcare." Id. at 816. Later, the supreme court agreed
with the Director's assessment. Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1091.
137. Brief of Appellant II, supra note 132, app. 32 at 808-16.
138. Id. app. 37 at 832.
139. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-51 (1997).
140. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I.
1970).
141. Brief of Appellant II, supra note 132, app. 37 at 833.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 71. The decision on the TRO was oral.
144. Id. at 73.
20051
708 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:685
gardless of the State's victory on the TRO, however, a drawn-out
legal battle began at the expense of the taxpayer.
2. Preliminary Injunction and Discovery
Rhode Island Superior Court Chief Judge Joseph F. Rodgers
transferred the entire matter to superior court Judge Netti C. Vo-
gel.145 Blue Cross then filed a motion for expedited discovery. Blue
Cross requested that the court permit numerous oral depositions
of key state employees and consultants, including the Director of
the Department of Administration. Judge Vogel allowed the par-
ties to submit legal briefs and oral argument on the issue of
whether discovery should be permitted, and, if allowed, the extent
of such discovery.
The State argued that no discovery should be permitted be-
cause the court already had thousands of pages of detailed records
that documented each step of the procurement process, and that
no gap in the agency record existed. 146 The rationale behind this
argument was that the standard of review in this case was stricter
than an appeal under the APA; the review should be limited to the
record formed at the agency level, similar to the APA. Without any
preliminary showing on the current record by Blue Cross that the
State engaged in corruption, bad faith or a palpable abuse of dis-
cretion, and in light of the presumption, there was no basis to
permit discovery.X47 Additionally, the State argued that allowing
discovery would further encourage bid protest litigation by losing
bidders. 148 Blue Cross countered that discovery, including deposi-
tions, should be permitted notwithstanding the difficult burden
and despite the fact that there was no allegation of fraud, corrup-
145. According to the Chief Judge Rodgers, the case was transferred from
Judge Daniel A. Procaccini to Judge Nettie C. Vogel because Judge Procaccini
did not have available time on his calendar to hear the balance of the matter.
146. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Expedited Discovery at
5, 7, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074 (R.I. 2005)
(No. 04-361-A) [hereinafter Defendant's Objection].
147. Without a showing of corruption, bad faith or a "palpable abuse of
discretion," the State contended that allowing discovery would negate its
statutory presumption of correctness under R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-2-51 (1997),
and allow every disappointed bidder to use the discovery process when they
were unhappy with the result. See Defendant's Objection, supra note 146. To
allow the use of discovery in this manner would undermine the very broad
discretion given to the Chief Purchasing Officer under statute.
148. Defendant's Objection, supra note 146, at 8.
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tion, or bad faith and in the procurement process. Blue Cross
stated that it had the right to conduct depositions to determine
whether there had been a palpable abuse of discretion by the
State. Blue Cross contended that allowing discovery was critical to
determining the rationale behind the State's decision to award the
health care contract to United.
The court orally held that the APA does not apply to bid pro-
test litigation, and allowed Blue Cross to take the depositions of
the Director, all three members of the A & E Committee, two con-
sultants from Hewitt, and one employee from United.149 Although
the scope of the depositions was limited to the general subject of
the health care contract bid, Blue Cross had unlimited permission
to depose this topic.150
149. Specifically, the superior court stated the following:
Having determined that the Plaintiff is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, having determined that the APA does not apply, it would
seem that the Court should allow discovery of matters calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at the evidentiary hear-
ing.... I am going to allow the requested discovery.
Brief of Appellant I, supra note 101, app. 47 at 18. Blue Cross requested to
depose: (1) Beverly Najarian, Chief Purchasing Officer and Director of the
Department of Administration; (2) William Anderson, Member of Selection
Committee and Administrator of Purchasing Systems; (3) George DeTar-
nowsky, Member of Selection Committee; (4) Stephen Johnson, Member of
Selection Committee and Deputy Director of Administration; (5) Krista Mor-
ris, Representative of Hewitt Associates LLC, State's Consultant; (6) Robert
Kennedy, Representative of Hewitt Associates LLC, State's Consultant; (7)
Patrick O'Brien, United Healthcare of New England Representative; and (8)
Sue Robinson, United Healthcare Lead Underwriter. Plaintiffs Identification
of Requested Deponents and Subject Matter of Inquiry at 1, Blue Cross &
Blue Shield or R.I. v. Najarian, No. C.A. 04-5942, 2004 WL 2821629 (R.I. Su-
per. Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Identification] (on file with author).
Under the current state of the law, the decision that the APA does not apply
- and thus discovery is allowed - was, in the authors' view, the legally correct
one. Therefore, the primary contention of this paper is that the law should be
changed to prevent discovery and a trial during bid protest litigation.
150. See generally Plaintiffs Identification, supra note 149. The substance
of the inquiry requested by Blue Cross was to ask each deponent "questions
regarding his or her role in the procurement process, the documents reviewed
and the basis for determinations, recommendations and/or award of the sub-
ject request for proposal." Id. at 2. The State argued that (1) all of these areas
were covered in the thousands of pages of documentation, and (2) Blue Cross
was inappropriately attempting to dissect the decision-making process of the
State. See Defendant's Objection, supra note 146, at 5-10. Over the State's
objections, the superior court approved Blue Court's entire list of deponents
and all of the topics for questioning.
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After the completion of discovery, 151 the court conducted a
three day hearing on the preliminary injunction. At the conclusion
of a three day hearing, the superior court issued a forty-two page
decision granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the State
from entering into a contract with United, and ordering that the
health care contract be re-bid. 152
Based entirely on the depositions conducted by Blue Cross at-
torneys, the court drew inferences that the procurement process
was characterized by both a palpable and clearly unwarranted
abuse of discretion. The court relied critically on the fact, empha-
sized by the Blue Cross attorneys during a deposition, that one of
the State's representatives was unfamiliar with the purchasing
regulations. 53 The court ignored the fact that many experienced
State officials who were not deposed were also involved in this
process, and were members of the subcommittee primarily
charged with evaluating the proposals. 54 Instead, the court chose
to focus on the limited facts, drawn out by Blue Cross attorneys, in
concluding that overturning the award was justified because cer-
tain State officials failed to memorize every line of over one hun-
dred pages of purchasing regulations.
Specifically, the court decided that the State erred by: (1) con-
sidering the wrong administrative fee in year one proposed by
Blue Cross; (2) improperly modifying the RFP by allowing United
151. The discovery process lasted eight days with depositions scheduled
virtually every day.
152. Najarian, 2004 WL 2821629, at *24. After the entry of the prelimi-
nary injunction, the State requested that the superior court stay its order
with respect to the injunction against proceeding with the contract and the
order to re-solicit of health care program. The Superior Court denied the ap-
plication to stay the injunction against proceeding with the contract but
stayed its order for immediate re-solicitation. Brief of Appellant I, supra note
101, app. 2 at 43-44. Upon agreement of all parties, the superior court con-
verted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction and entered a
final judgment. Id.
153. Najarian, 2004 WL 2821629, at *1 ("The purposes of the State Pur-
chasing Act and departmental regulations were thwarted by inexperienced
State officials and consultants who approached this important task without
bothering to familiarize themselves with the applicable law.").
154. This fact was before the court as part of the thousands of pages
documenting the bid process. The State did not have the resources, or the de-
sire, to depose every single person involved with the process to defend itself,
especially in light of the presumption of correctness afforded to the State and
the consistent supreme court precedent.
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to apply a credit to the administrative fee as a form of a rebate
guarantee; (3) not finding United's bid non-responsive when
United failed to provide certain fees for retirees; (4) penalizing
Blue Cross because it is regulated by the State; (5) allowing
United to modify its offer after the acceptance of "best and final"
offers and; (6) allowing United to modify its bid with respect to
crossover services. 5 5 In essence, the court disagreed with the
State on every issue alleged by Blue Cross, regardless of the
State's entitlement to a presumption of correctness. The State was
forced to appeal this decision to the supreme court, leading to fur-
ther delay, wasted resources and expenditure of taxpayer dollars.
3. Rhode Island Supreme Court Appeal
The day after the entry of final judgment, the State and
United filed an application with the Rhode Island Supreme Court
to stay the superior court's decision and to hear an appeal. 156 On
January 18, 2005, the court heard oral argument and considered
the briefs of the parties. On February 3, 2005 the court issued a
unanimous decision reversing the superior court.
57
The court commented on the very high standard a superior
court judge must deem satisfied to overturn a public award: "On
numerous occasions this court has said that the hurdle to be over-
come in overturning a decision made by an awarding authority in
the public bid process is very high indeed." 58 Restating law estab-
lished in a long line of prior cases, the court emphasized once
again that the judiciary will only interfere with the award of a
State or municipal contract in the event that the awarding author-
ity has "acted corruptly or in bad faith, or so unreasonably or so
155. See Najarian, 2004 W'L 2821629, at *1-2.
156. Chief Justice Frank J. Williams of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
was assigned as intake justice and met immediately with counsel for all par-
ties. The supreme court held a conference on the matter and, after consider-
ing the papers filed by all parties, denied to stay the superior court decision
with respect to the contract implementation. However, the supreme court
granted the State's application to stay the re-solicitation and the court agreed
to hear the case in approximately thirty days. The court also set forth an ab-
breviated and aggressive briefing schedule.
157. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 865 A.2d 1074, 1091
(R.I. 2005). Justice Goldberg did not participate in the oral arguments or in
the decision. See id. at 1074.
158. Id. at 1081.
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arbitrarily as to be guilty of a palpable abuse of discretion."159
The court once again recognized the presumption of correct-
ness afforded to state officials who are "vested with the thorny
task of balancing the letter of the law found in the act with the re-
ality of pursuing the best deal for the State."160 It also expressed
its appreciation for the State's difficult task in awarding con-
tracts. 161 As Blue Cross never alleged bad faith or corruption, 162
the sole issue before the superior court was whether the State's
conduct rose to the level of a "palpable abuse of discretion."163 The
supreme court found that, although certain mistakes had been
made during a very complicated procurement and evaluation
process, these mistakes did not constitute the "palpable abuse of
discretion" necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of
correctness, and to subsequently overturn this award.164 The court
addressed, in detail, each of the six activities that formed the basis
for overturning the State's award in the lower court. First, al-
though the State compared "mature" fees of the two bidders when
the State had actually requested an "immature" fee quotes did not
rise to the level of a "palpable abuse of discretion."65 Second, the
State's decision to accept a guaranteed pharmacy rebate from
United, rather than a higher projected, un-guaranteed rebate from
Blue Cross, was an acceptable business decision.66 Third, by find-
ing that United's bid was non-responsive because it failed to pre-
sent certain illustrative, meaningless figures, the lower court
erred. 67 Fourth, the trial court erred in finding that the State
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1082.
161. Id. ("Our case law reviewing public procurement contracts has un-
folded based on our appreciation for the difficulty in awarding a public con-
tract.").
162. Id. at 1084 & 1085 n.7 ("Counsel for Blue Cross stated on the record:
'Certainly fraud which we don't allege here. I want to make that clear on the
record. There is nothing on the record, at least in my view, that suggests
there was any corruption here. What the record does disclose, however, was a
failure to abide by the rules.'").
163. Id. at 1081.
164. Id. at 1091. The court also recognized that any government procure-
ment process under the scrutiny of a "good lawyer" will have minor violations
of process. Id. at 1084.
165. Id. at 1086.
166. Id. at 1087.
167. Id. at 1087-88. The court found that there was no "palpable abuse of
discretion" "for declining to assess figures that have no real life bearing on
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"wrongfully penalized Blue Cross because the company is subject
to state regulation of its Plan 65 Medigap indemnity program."
168
Fifth, the superior court "wrongfully characterized communica-
tions" - related to a twenty-four hour nurse line fee - when it
found that the State's request for a clarification of United's "best
and final offer" was improper. 169 Finally, the superior court erred
when it found that crossover services offered by United were im-
proper after the contract was awarded.1 70 The court reversed all
six findings of the lower court.
The supreme court found that "a fair and open bid process
was conducted in good faith."' 7' Once again, the court overwhelm-
ingly reversed the decision of a superior court judge who inter-
fered with a government procurement process. 72 The original
decision of the Director was reinstated, but not before this litiga-
tion impacted State government and the taxpayer.
4. The Impact of the Litigation on the State
The Rhode Island Supreme Court fully understood the State
faces a "thorny task" with every purchasing decision. 173 The State
is required to "balance the letter of the law found in the act with
the realty of pursuing the best deal for the State." 74 Very few pur-
chasing decisions are made solely on price, but on a variety of
other criteria. The State Purchasing Division attempts to evaluate
objective criteria from bidders to determine the most responsive
and responsible bidder in obtaining the "best value" for the state.
Numerous factors are considered, and a decision is made based on
the contract" and that the superior court "improperly substituted [its] own
judgment in vacating the State's presumptively correct decision." Id. at 1088.
168. Id. at 1088-89.
169. Id. at 1089-90. The supreme court found that "the trial judge miscon-
ceived the evidence and wrongly characterized the communications." Id. The
court went on to state that "with so many taxpayer dollars at stake it would
have been irresponsible for the State not to seek clarification." Id
170. Id. at 1090-91 ("[Nlothing prevents a bidder from offering to provide a
gratuitous service to the State that was not mentioned in the RFP.").
171. Id. at 1091.
172. See, e.g., H.V. Collins Co. v. Tarro, 696 A.2d 298, 305-06 (R.I. 1997);
Truk Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc., 643 A.2d 811, 817
(R.I. 1994).
173. Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1082.
174. Id.
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the sound business judgment of purchasing officials.175 The ability
of a disgruntled losing bidder to litigate every purchasing decision
by asking a court to second guess the business judgment of pur-
chasing officials has unintended consequences, including in-
creased cost for products and services to taxpayers.
These consequences are evident as a result of the Blue Cross
litigation. A group of experienced state employees prepared a
comprehensive RFP, evaluated two proposals comprised of thou-
sands of pages, and made recommendations to obtain the best
value for the taxpayers of Rhode Island.176 According to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, these state employees acted fairly and
honestly, and reasonably exercised sound discretion during the
procurement process. 177 Without any showing of corruption, bad
faith, or "palpable abuse of discretion,"178 the superior court al-
lowed Blue Cross to conduct an expensive and time consuming
"fishing expedition." In response, the State was forced to dedicate
hundreds of hours of employee resources in preparation for seven
lengthy depositions and the subsequent litigation, in order to de-
fend a decision that was to be presumed correct. 179 Blue Cross
then used a limited sampling of depositions to create an "aura of
confusion" by emphasizing inconsistencies in the process in an at-
tempt to convince the superior court to substitute its judgment for
that of responsible State purchasing officials.180 Additionally, the
State spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, consult-
ing costs, court reporter fees and printing costs to defend its pur-
chasing decision.181
175. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 400(R.I. 1970).
176. See Najarian, 865 A.2d at 1082.
177. Id. at 1084, 1091.
178. Id. at 1091.
179. Seven of the eight people that Blue Cross requested to be deposed ac-
tually were. See supra notes 9, 149. The only person not deposed was KristaMorris, Representative for Hewitt. The depositions of Stephen Johnston and
Robert Kennedy were the longest, and the transcripts spanned well over a
hundred pages. All of the depositions lasted several hours each.
180. See Truk Away of R.I., Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, Inc., 643
A.2d 811, 816 (R.I. 1994).
181. The State will attempt to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars inlegal fees from the bond posted by Blue Cross. The issue of whether the bond
covers the State's legal fees will likely be heard in the future. Regardless of
whether the State or Blue Cross pays the legal costs, the Rhode Island tax-
payer, or members of the not-for-profit Blue Cross (also Rhode Island taxpay-
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As the law presently stands, any disappointed bidder who is
not awarded a State contract - even a contract as seemingly in-
significant as a five hundred dollar medical supply agreement -
and is willing to spend the money and time can demand discovery
to uncover the rationale behind the State's "presumptively proper"
decision. The losing bidder can force state officials, evaluation
committee members, A & E Committee members, the Director and
even the successful bidder to be subjected to lengthy depositions.
As a result, bid protest litigation has placed government officials
in a "legalistic straightjacket," despite the supreme court's efforts
to avoid this result. 8 2 Legislative change is necessary.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
First, the Purchasing Act should be amended to include pro-
cedural limitations similar to those in the APA for lawsuits involv-
ing a bid protest.'i 3 Second, the Purchasing Act should be
amended to include the option for a hearing at the agency level.
Finally, the Purchasing Act, like the APA, should place the supe-
rior court in the role of a court of review, not that of a trial court.
The purpose of these amendments is to maintain the integrity of
the purchasing process while simultaneously preventing resources
from being wasted during frivolous bid protest litigation.
A. Confinement of the Record
The first limitation should include a provision, similar to
Rhode Island General Law section 42-35-15(f) of the Rhode Island
APA, that confines superior court review to the record created by
the agency, without a jury.i 4 This limitation, however, is not
ers), will be footing the bill.
182. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v Bd. of Trs of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 400
(R.I. 1970).
183. The authors considered simply including a provision in the Purchas-
ing Act to mandate that courts treat bid protests under the provisions of the
APA. Another consideration was to create a hearing process by law or regula-
tion, see infra Part III.C, so that a bid protest would become a contested case
and then simply fall under the APA. However, because the standard of re-
view in the Purchasing Act is higher than under the APA, and there is well-
developed case law interpreting this standard, the better option is to leave
these two Acts independent.
184. Pennsylvania includes such a limitation. After the head of the pur-
chasing agency receives and evaluates a bid protest and issues a written de-
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without exception: "In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be
taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argu-
ment and receive written briefs."185 Under the APA, the court may
order the agency to consider additional evidence and, as a result,
the agency then may modify its decision.186 Therefore, if a party
challenging a contract award has evidence of fraud, corruption or
bad faith, this evidence may be introduced, heard and considered
by the superior court and/or the agency.
The purchasing process includes a comprehensive procedure
mandated by statute and regulation.187 This process must be well
cision, the aggrieved party has the right to appeal. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §1711.1 (West Supp. 2004). Section 1711.1 states:
(g) Appeal. - Within 15 days of the mailing date of a final determina-
tion denying a protest, a protestant may file an appeal with Com-
monwealth Court. Issues not raised by the protestant before thepurchasing agency are deemed waived and may not be raised before
the court.
Id. § 1711.1(g). The statute then defines the scope of the record:
(h) Record of determination. - The record of determination for reviewby the court shall consist of the solicitation or award; the contract, if
any; the protest; any response or reply; any additional documents orinformation considered by the head of the purchasing agency or hisdesignee; the hearing transcript and exhibits, if any; and the final
determination.
Id. § 1711.1(h). Finally, the statute clearly defines the scope of the appeal and
the standard to be applied:
(i) Standard of review. - The court shall hear the appeal, without ajury, on the record of determination certified by the purchasing
agency. The court shall affirm the determination of the purchasing
agency unless it finds from the record that the determination is arbi-
trary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or is contrary to law.Id. § 1711.1(i) (emphasis added).
185. R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-35-15 (f) (1997).
186. The APA provides:
If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court forleave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the additional evidence is material and that
there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding be-fore the agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be
taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court.The agency may modify its findings and decision by reason of the
additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifica-
tions, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.
Id. § 42-35-15 (e).
187. See generally id. § 37-2-1 et seq.
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documented, and it is open for review. i 8 Limiting judicial exami-
nation to the agency record would make the superior court a court
of appeal, similar to its role imposed by the APA in administrative
matters. Bid protest litigation would be streamlined; a losing bid-
der would be prevented from going on a "fishing expedition" for in-
consistencies by deposing government officials in an effort to
undermine a bid awarded to a competitor.
B. Writ of Certiorari
Unlike the APA, every bid protest challenge brought before
the superior court is entitled to an appeal before the supreme
court. 8 9 In light of the extremely high standard discussed above,
such a review would appear to be unnecessary and, in many in-
stances, frivolous. The State is forced to expend further resources
and taxpayer money to defend itself before the supreme court. The
Purchasing Act should allow the supreme court discretion to ei-
ther hear an appeal or require a petition for a writ of certiorari.
The parties would have an opportunity to show cause as to why a
writ should or should not be granted. Allowing the supreme court
to decide whether to accept a case by writ will save resources in
two ways: (1) State officials will not have to defend themselves at
another level unless warranted; and (2) the supreme court, funded
also by taxpayer dollars, will not be forced to hear cases without
merit.
C. An Opportunity to be Heard at the Agency Level
Similar to a contested case before the APA, a losing bidder or
another party (such as a taxpayer) should be allowed to be heard
at the agency level if deemed appropriate by the Purchasing
Agent. 190 If a hearing is warranted, a hearing officer would con-
sider arguments related to a bid protest and further develop the
agency record which could then be considered by the supreme
188. Id. § 37-2-54 (i); see also id. § 38-2-1. The health care contract award
involves mountains of documents, all available for review by either bidder or
any other party.
189. Id. § 9-24-11.
190. Such a hearing at the agency level should have similar limitations
regarding the extent of the record and discovery, as discussed above. See dis-
cussion supra Part II.C.4. In other words, it is not the authors' intent to sim-
ply move the problem of bid protest litigation from the court to the agency.
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court. 191 Many other states already include some form of hearing
for a bid protest.192 Allowing a hearing at the agency level, if nec-
essary, would provide a losing bidder an opportunity to challenge
a contract award in the appropriate forum. Any issues of bad
faith, corruption or fraud can then be immediately addressed at
the agency level, and would become part of the agency record.
Providing for a hearing would also make the Purchasing Act more
consistent with the APA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ability of a losing bidder to bring an unfettered lawsuit
involving discovery, a possible trial and automatic review by the
supreme court is inconsistent with the burden of proof required to
overturn a procurement decision. Government resources and tax-
payer dollars are needlessly consumed. Procedural limitations on
bid protest lawsuits, similar to the limitations imposed on suits
brought under the APA, should be implemented by the legislature
to end such needless waste of resources.
191. It is necessary to note that there is an issue concerning the neutrality
of hearing officers in Rhode Island because these individuals have an em-ployment relationship with the agency in which they are hearing a case. For
a full discussion of this issue, see generally Daniel W. Majcher, Administra-
tive Injustice: The Rhode Island State Agency Hearing Process and a Recom-
mendation for Change, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 735 (2004).
192. Rhode Island adopted the code without this optional provision. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
